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CORNELL H R REVIEW 
THE EXECUTIVE PAY DRAMA: FROM COMEDY TO TRAGEDY 
David J. Cherrington 
Over the past century, an interesting play has been performed in the United States called 
Executive Pay, Starring Your Local CEO. The play opened as a comedy, with executive 
bonuses and stock options rising at ridiculous rates compared to the pay of factory 
workers, teachers, and engineers.1 
The performance didn't get a lot of laughs, but people would smile and shake their heads 
as if the surprise of ever-escalating pay was an amusing disclosure. During economic 
downturns there were fewer smiles, and some outspoken critics were remarkably blunt in 
labeling executive pay practices as "enormous," "immoral," and "outrageous."2 The title 
of the cover story in a 2003 Fortune article forthrightly asked "Have They No Shame?" 
This article described dozens of CEOs who accepted millions of dollars in bonuses and 
stock options while their firm's shareholder returns plummeted. 
The play subsequently evolved into a drama and the players included not only CEOs but 
also others in the finance industry who received millions of dollars in salaries and 
outrageous bonuses. The audience's reaction to this drama can best be described as public 
outrage for the entire cast. The reason for this outrage is that the money for these 
outlandish bonuses was provided by government bailouts. However, it should not take 
much to see that the source of these outrageous compensation packages is not much 
different than before. It still comes from the same people: employees, stockholders, and 
tax-paying customers. 
A new role was added to the cast of characters in 2009: a pay czar who is responsible for 
setting fair compensation. Like the traditional villain, this person is in an impossible 
position and knows that whatever he does will be criticized by some for doing too much 
and by others for not doing enough. 
Our response to this drama contains an important lesson in morality for all of us. Should 
we rely on legislation to correct problems or should we act collectively to make ethical 
decisions? After careful thought, it becomes clear that legislation is a seductive copout 
that makes matters worse and detracts from our obligation to accept accountability for 
our individual and collective decisions. 
The Failure of Legislation 
During the 1990s, the United States Congress thought it had the power to rein in rampant 
pay increases. It capped the amount of pay that can be treated as a pre-tax expense at $1 
million, unless the additional compensation was based on performance measures. Rather 
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than tying executive pay to performance, this law had the unintended consequence of 
establishing $1 million as the minimum CEO salary. From this act emerged a new 
compensation norm and a scramble for higher pay.4 
Quickly our drama became a soap opera as executives and their boards manipulated 
performance targets, granted additional options, and backdated stock options to 
perpetuate ever-increasing executive pay.5 Dozens of executives and their compensation 
committees were shocked to see the vigor with which executives were prosecuted for 
simply altering the date of their stock options by a few days to increase the value of the 
grant. Dozens have been accused of such manipulations and most of them either resigned 
under pressure or were terminated in disgrace. Investigating and prosecuting this problem 
could overwhelm our legal system since it is estimated that as many as 2,000 companies 
improperly backdated stock options.6 
On one hand, their punishments were just—they should have known the law and obeyed 
it. On the other hand, if their boards wanted them to get more money, they could have 
simply granted more shares or manipulated the requirements in other ways to get around 
the problem. At any rate, the soap opera continued with ever-escalating pay levels plus 
criminal sanctions and a cadre of inspectors and prosecutors. Keep in mind that 
inspectors and prosecutors do not produce consumer products that improve the quality of 
life; time spent in court is time spent away from other productive activities. 
Something we should learn from this soap opera is that federal regulations are neither 
effective nor efficient. Compensation needs to be viewed as a moral issue that must be 
guided by ethical criteria rather than legal constraints. People who are smart enough to 
run our corporations are smart enough to subvert legislation restricting their pay. 
This drama is not unique to the United States; there is moral outrage in other countries 
calling for legislative restraints. Member states of the European Union have pleaded for 
international cooperation to launch a united front aimed at curbing excessive pay and 
bonuses. In the United Kingdom banks are required to pay a 50 percent tax on individual 
o 
bonuses that exceed £25,000 (about $41,000). Thus a bank that gives someone a £35,000 
bonus would have to pay a £5,000 tax. 
Within the past few months, our executive-pay play has turned into a tragedy, as the 2009 
stimulus law prohibits any company that receives a federal bailout from paying bonuses 
to top earners. Bonuses may not amount to more than one-third of their total annual 
compensation. This restriction will severely impact top officials in the financial services 
industry where they have become accustomed to receiving bonuses worth millions of 
dollars and in some cases even hundreds of millions of dollars.9 Now, an employee 
earning $1 million pay can receive a bonus of no more than $500,000, which is one third 
of $1.5 million total pay. 
It will be interesting to see how the new law is administered and how public pressure 
impacts the interpretation of the new restrictions. It will be even more interesting to see 
whether executive pay moves toward reasonable levels or continues to escalate after the 
2 
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companies that received bailouts repay the loans. History suggests that when the 
downturn reverses, moral outrage will subside, boards will find new ways to give 
exorbitant earnings, and executive pay will continue to escalate. 
On the other hand, if the caps on executive pay are effectively enforced and heavy 
punishments are administered to those caught violating them, is this really a desirable 
situation? Do we want arbitrary limits on executive compensation and should these 
decisions be made by government officials? Do we want criminal sanctions imposed on 
those who violate the caps with all of the wasted time and effort that criminal 
enforcement entails? 
Lost in this debate is any discussion about the morality of executive pay and what ethical 
standards should be used to make pay decisions. Why should the pay packages in the 
financial services industry be so much greater than wages in the retail industry? Does 
anyone appreciate how much money must be invested at a given interest rate to generate 
a $10 million bonus for just one person? Do board members appreciate how many 
vehicles must be sold on narrow profit margins to cover the cost of an auto company 
executive's stock grant? 
Ethical Processes 
From an ethical perspective, two ethical processes help us understand why executive pay 
has become so distorted: the normalization of bad behavior and paying for peril. The 
normalization of bad behavior refers to the gradual rationalization of misbehavior that 
occurs over time. The first time we do something wrong, we usually feel guilty because 
we know our behavior violates a standard of acceptable conduct. But when we do it the 
second time, and each succeeding time, the feelings of guilt are reduced as we rationalize 
what we have done. This process is illustrated by the proverb: anything you do wrong the 
first time is easier to do the second time. Another proverb in the behavioral sciences is 
that whenever there is an inconsistency between one's attitudes and behaviors, behavior 
always wins, meaning that we will rationalize our misbehavior by changing our attitudes 
rather than reform our misbehavior. Rationalization is especially easy when we see others 
doing the same thing. 
The application of this ethical process to executive compensation requires only a cursory 
glance at the history of CEO pay. As a multiple of the average worker's pay, the median 
CEO pay has grown from a multiple of 24 times in 1965 to 50 times in 1985 to 91 times 
in 1995, to 194 times in 2005.10 This long history of escalating increases naturally 
induces executives to expect enormous salaries, big bonuses, and large amounts of stock 
options. Rather than thinking they are overpaid, the normal rationalization process would 
cause them to honestly believe they deserve everything they receive, even if they are 
terminating jobs and closing factories. 
The paying for peril process refers to rewarding short-term successes and overlooking the 
long-term suffering that might be caused. Executives have historically been rewarded for 
taking on excessive risk in the quest to increase next quarter's profits. This short-term 
3 
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thinking has been driven by the increasingly clamorous demands of shareholders for 
higher earnings and compensation formulas that reward executives for immediate profits. 
The long-term consequences of these risky decisions may be unclear, but what is clear is 
that the executives will not be held accountable for them. 
Paying for peril can be observed when executives who are eager to maximize the value of 
their stock options begin adopting massive stock-buyback programs that drain much-
needed capital out of their firms, jumping into risky "proprietary trading" strategies with 
credit default swaps and other derivatives, cutting payroll and research and development 
budgets, and even resorting to outright accounting fraud to hide liabilities in off-balance-
sheet entities.11 
To reduce this unhealthy obsession with short-term profits, many have suggested tying 
executive compensation to long-term profitability. Many efforts have been made in this 
direction by giving executives restricted stock awards that vest over time when specific 
performance goals are achieved. Occasionally executives have been greatly disappointed 
when their companies have failed to achieve the necessary goals, often due to economic 
factors beyond their control. Others have been severely punished by receiving stock that 
has declined in value. This is the way capitalism is supposed to work, but it is not 
necessarily fair. 
Across the board, we need to discuss a new paradigm for deciding executive pay; and we 
need to address it as an ethical issue rather than a legal problem. Hopefully, 
compensation committees will begin to recognize that enormous pay packages are 
outrageous and immoral—they destroy the viability of companies and society, and they 
are blatantly unfair relative to others. 
A Fair Compensation Maxim 
I propose the following pay maxim (ethical guideline), not just for executives but for all 
employees: employees should be compensated first according to the requirements of the 
jobs they perform and how well they perform them, and second by labor market 
conditions (supply and demand) and the organization's ability to pay. Obviously, this 
guideline is not precise; it requires judgment and experience to implement. But all 
managerial decisions are moral decisions that require judgment and skill. 
The greatest obstacle to deciding what is "fair" is the absence of a clear standard for 
making pay decisions. There are no universal standards or formulas for calculating how 
much money an employee deserves. When we examine how much people earn, the range 
of pay is so widely dispersed that there seems to be no semblance of order. In frustration, 
many people conclude that pay is random and depends simply on whatever each worker 
can negotiate. This may be the case with executive pay, but it is not true for the vast 
majority of employees whose pay is established by legitimate compensation criteria. 
4 
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Pay Fairness Criteria 
When we segment the labor market, we discover that there are legitimate criteria that 
ought to be used to make pay decisions. Stated differently, rational and reasonable 
decisions can be made regarding what is a fair range of pay when we divide the labor 
market into meaningful job categories. One labor-market segment consists of blue-collar 
and non-supervisory white-collar workers. These are the people who work in the offices, 
stores, and factories of America. They are typically paid according to an hourly wage rate 
with no bonuses or stock options. Their pay is determined by such compensable factors 
as mental and physical demands, knowledge and skill requirements, and working 
conditions. 
In spite of a few exceptions, wage surveys indicate that most of the workers in this labor 
segment receive wages that seem quite legitimate. The range of pay for this labor 
segment is about 1:2 for blue-collar jobs and 1:3 for non-supervisory white-collar jobs. 
That is, an entry-level blue-collar worker makes about half as much as a highly skilled, 
senior worker doing the same job. The highest paid office workers make triple the pay of 
entry-level workers doing the same work. These pay ranges seem reasonable since highly 
skilled, experienced workers deserve to be paid more and organizations want to reward 
both performance and seniority. It seems legitimate for companies to reward loyal 
workers who stay with the company. 
Another labor-market segment consists of professional employees. This segment includes 
employees such as teachers, engineers, chemists, and doctors. These workers typically 
receive an annual salary that is based primarily on the amount of knowledge and 
education required to certify as a professional. The pay of professional workers increases 
with years of service since experience is seen as an important predictor of ability and 
performance. Again, wage surveys provide useful data showing what professional 
employees ought to be paid and their compensation can be justified by legitimate criteria. 
The range of pay for these employees is usually about 1:4 or 1:5, depending on the 
profession and the company. That is, senior-level partners in accounting and law firms 
are typically paid about four or five times as much as entry-level professionals just 
joining the firm. The legitimacy of these wide pay differentials are sometimes questioned, 
but they are justified by the contributions senior partners make to the firm. Senior 
partners are primarily responsible for acquiring new business and making strategic 
decisions that protect and perpetuate the firm. 
Professional athletes, entertainers, and entrepreneurs form a third labor segment, and their 
incomes are extremely diverse and frequently criticized. Some receive little more than 
minimum wage, such as dancers and singers in chorus lines, while others receive millions 
of dollars for only a few hours' work. The compensation of this group is not based on 
job-related compensable factors like the previous segments but on the laws of supply and 
demand. If two people can convince a million people to pay $100 each to watch them put 
on gloves and bash each other in the face, they can split $100 million dollars. Anyone 
who makes a movie or a CD and sells it to a million listeners for a ten dollar profit will 
earn $10 million. 
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People who are outraged by the incomes of professional athletes and entertainers should 
think twice before seeing their movies or attending their concerts and games. But we 
should also think twice before we take any actions that would prevent these people from 
receiving the profits from their efforts. Some entrepreneurs make millions of dollars and 
we should congratulate them and appreciate their success because it means that they have 
done something that is perceived by the consuming public as providing a useful product 
or service. In general, societies benefit from the contributions and economic success of 
their entrepreneurs; the entrepreneurial spirit that is fostered in selected cultures ought to 
be viewed as a national treasure. 
Executives and managers form the next segment of the labor market. This segment is 
where our ethical standards generally crumble with respect to compensation. The pay of 
this group ought to be determined by the requirements of the job (such as level of 
responsibility, number of people supervised, and number of levels in the company); how 
well they are performing (as reflected by the long-term profitability of the company); the 
uniqueness of the person's contribution to the company's success; and the profitability of 
the company. Instead, executive pay is determined more by sources of power than by 
rational compensable factors. 
Before 1990, the pay of CEOs was criticized for being enormous and exorbitant. Year 
after year, the disclosures of CEO compensation were accompanied with surprise and 
indignation, and there were countless suggestions that "something" needed to be done. 
The moral outrage against exorbitant CEO pay was especially bitter during economic 
downturns when executives were reaping gigantic salary increases, bonuses, and stock 
options at the same time they were closing factories and firing workers.12 
During the past two decades the disease of exorbitant pay has spread like a cancer beyond 
CEOs to other executive and administrative jobs, including boards of directors. Board 
chairmen, chief operating officers, chief finance officers, and other vice presidents have 
also come to expect lavish stock options and bonuses that often exceed a million dollars. 
In the financial services industry, exorbitant bonuses are even paid to hundreds of 
employees who have no managerial responsibilities. Many money managers, especially 
hedge fund managers, have come to expect multi-million dollar bonuses as an acceptable 
1 Q 
and normal part of their annual pay. 
Power versus Rational Compensable Factors 
Executive pay is set by the board of directors, which sounds quite rational except for the 
fact that pay recommendations are usually made by compensation committees comprised 
of other executives who are equally overpaid.14 These pay recommendations are biased 
by comparisons with other executives and foolish myths. 
One myth is the idea that every executive deserves to be paid above average. This is a 
myth that every good statistician knows is statistically impossible. It is easy to appreciate 
the interpersonal dynamics in a board of directors as they discuss executive pay and how 
this dynamic leads to large pay increases. If the board thinks the executive team is doing 
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well, they want to reward them with above average pay. But if the executive team is not 
doing well, the board may still decide to award above average pay to encourage them or 
to prevent negative feelings. Either way, no board wants to pay its executives below 
average even though, statistically, half of them must. But this is exactly what the boards 
need to do. They need to base their decisions on a totally different set of compensation 
criteria that ignore the distortions of history. 
A second myth is that executive pay should be comparable to the pay of professional 
athletes, entertainers, and entrepreneurs, although there are no good reasons for such 
comparisons. Saying "If professional athletes get millions of dollars, why shouldn't we?" 
is more like a greedy rationalization than a thoughtful reason. It would be more 
meaningful to compare their responsibilities for decision making, leadership, and 
financial control with such positions as governors, state and federal legislators, university 
presidents, and military leaders. 
The market conditions of supply and demand that play such a prominent role in the 
determination of pay for professional athletes, entertainers, and entrepreneurs are not the 
same for executives and administrators. Even hedge fund managers do not deserve a 
fixed percentage of the profits they generate for their firm because they are not using 
their own money, they are not a sole proprietor bearing the risk of their actions 
("entrepreneur" means risk bearer), and they do not suffer the consequences of bad 
decisions. 
Executives are employees in an organization and their compensation should be based on 
reasonable compensable factors the same as for professional, blue-collar, and non-
supervisory white-collar positions. Job evaluation systems, such as the point method, 
should be used to determine the pay ranges for executives. Obviously, executives will 
receive many points for such compensable factors as supervision and financial 
responsibility, so their pay will be noticeably higher than for other employees; but their 
pay will be based on reasonable pay factors rather than the power relations among board 
members. 
Another myth is that executives are indispensable and could never be replaced by anyone 
else, a myth that history and experience fails to support. Rather than offering lavish 
bonuses, humongous stock options, and enormous retention packages, boards ought to 
pay reasonable amounts and be prepared to wish them well if they choose to leave. There 
are times in history when a key executive has made a crucial strategic decision or had a 
dramatic impact on the survival and success of a company because of his or her 
leadership or charismatic personality. At such times it is difficult to refute the claim that 
such individuals deserve lavish rewards for their unique contributions—they saved 
thousands of jobs, generated billions in profits, and produced valuable products and 
services for society. But most of the time, there are many other leaders who have the 
potential to step into the position and do just as well or better. Are gigantic signing 
bonuses and retention packages really necessary, or are they simply part of a culture of 
excessive pay and greed that has become disassociated with a careful ethical analysis of 
what is fair and reasonable? 
7 
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Conclusion 
The history of executive compensation clearly illustrates a decision-making process that 
has escalated out of control because the decisions were based on biased comparisons and 
power relationships rather than sound compensation theory. History also demonstrates 
that legislative attempts to control executive pay have been dysfunctional and have only 
exaggerated the problem. Future legislation will likely be equally ineffective; but even if 
it succeeds, it will be undesirable. Neither the legislative nor the executive branches of 
government are equipped to set rational caps on salaries, nor are they capable of 
evaluating the performance of executives and making informed decisions regarding fair 
bonuses. Caps on bonuses and salaries would have to be administered universally and all 
incentive and innovation would be destroyed. Laws have never motivated people to 
excellence—they have always produced the moral minimum. The greatest disruption, 
however, would likely be the legal challenges against those accused of violating the caps 
and the loss of time and money on both sides trying to resolve these challenges. 
Decisions regarding executive compensation should not be decided or enforced by the 
law. This should not be a legal issue. 
As a society, we need a new paradigm for deciding executive pay that is based on ethical 
criteria and sound compensation theory rather than legislative restrictions. Fairness needs 
to replace greed as our basic criterion for creating pay packages. K 
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